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THE REPUBLICAN MONARCHY REVISITED 
THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. By Walter Bagehot. 1 
Edited by Paul Smith.2 Cambridge University Press. 2001. 
Pp. xxxii, 253. $21.00 
Adam Tomkins3 
Of all the works of nineteenth-century British constitutional 
scholarship that have come down to us, two stand out. Among 
lawyers it is Dicel that continues to be revered above all others. 
But among communities of political scientists and journalists it is 
Bagehot who has that honor. 
The centenary of Bagehot's English Constitution was 
marked in 1967 with the publication of a new edition, edited by 
Richard Crossman. Crossman was a leading minister in the gov-
ernment of Harold Wilson, who was Prime Minister from 1964-
1970 and again from 1974-1976. Crossman's famous introduction 
to his edition of Bagehot was a masterpiece of reading the politi-
cal concerns and preoccupations of 1960s government into the 
work that Bagehot had written a century earlier, and as a result 
his introduction now looks very dated-indeed, it has withstood 
the test of time rather less impressively than have the far older 
words it introduced.5 Now the brilliant Cambridge University 
Press series of Texts in the History of Political Thought6 has 
added a new edition of Bagehot to its formidable list, this new 
edition edited and introduced by historian Paul Smith.7 To have 
the new scholarly edition alongside Crossman's more familiar 
one is welcome. A professional and historical (as opposed to 
popular and political) appraisal of Bagehot has been long com-
ing. It has been worth the wait. 
I. 1826-1877; English essayist, economist and journalist; editor of The Economist, 
1860-1877. 
2. Formerly Professor of History at the University of Southampton, England. 
3. Fellow and Tutor in Law, St Catherine's College, University of Oxford. 
4. Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(Macmillan, 1885). 
5. The Crossman edition was most recently republished in London, in 1993, by 
Fontana. 
6. The series is edited by Raymond Geuss and Quentin Skinner, both of the Uni-
versity of Cambridge. 
7. See note 2 above. 
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Smith has provided a reasonably short, but sharp, editorial 
introduction, which seeks to place Bagehot in historical context, 
and to explain what Bagehot aimed to achieve in writing The 
English Constitution. Whereas Crossman strained to insist that 
Bagehot could be read as an authority on the 1960s as much as 
he was on the 1860s, Smith is much more relaxed about letting 
Bagehot speak for himself, and about allowing readers to draw 
their own conclusions as to the relevance (or otherwise) of 
Bagehot's interpretations for today. Helpful yet unobtrusive, 
Smith's is an ideal introduction for those seeking to locate Bage-
hot in the context of his time or for those looking for an in-
formed summary of his argument, motivation, and general pur-
pose. In addition to his new introduction, Smith's edition 
appears with all the usual scholarly apparatus associated with the 
Cambridge series. He has included a list of the major personal 
and political events in Bagehot's lifetime; biographical notes of 
persons mentioned in the text; and a helpful if somewhat brief 
bibliographical note. Printed on high-quality paper, and priced 
reasonably, Smith's is surely set to be the principal edition of 
reference for the twenty-first century. 
I. BAGEHOT AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
Bagehot matters, even now. His work is of great importance 
to contemporary constitutional scholarship, both in Britain and 
to some extent also in the United States. His analysis of monar-
chy as a form of government, and of the constitutional roles of 
Parliament, remain leading statements, which should be studied 
by all serious students of comparative constitutional law. Com-
parative analysis has come relatively late to constitutional law, 
and one central element of good comparative scholarship that is 
still too frequently overlooked in the constitutional sphere is that 
of the history and development of political ideas. Constitutions 
are not drawn up out of the ether, and neither are they based on 
universal principles of justice. Rather, they are the products of 
the specific political climates in which they were forged. It is all 
too easy to forget that such climates change-it is in the nature 
of constitutions that they are so general in character that they 
are able to transcend the particular politics of the moment and 
appeal afresh to each new political generation. This is true at 
least of successful constitutions. There are more brittle constitu-
tions, that simply snap when the political wind changes, but they 
necessarily last only a short time, as France among others would 
surely testify. However, notwithstanding their political transcen-
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dentalism, all constitutions are constructs based on particular 
choices, priorities, and compromises, and all are informed by the 
mood-or political philosophy-prevalent at the time of their 
construction. 
Part of Bagehot's modern value, part of the reason why he 
continues to matter, is that he reminds us of the political mood 
at a time that was critical to the formation of the British constitu-
tional order-the mid-nineteenth century. It was Bagehot's self-
appointed and self-conscious task to paint a thumbnail sketch of 
the dominant political values of British constitutional life in the 
1860s. Nearly a century and a half on, it is perhaps easier for 
lawyers to recall the raw events of Bagehot's time than it is for 
us to evoke the perceptions of those events that were current at 
the time, yet it is the elusive perceptions as much as it is the 
events themselves that go to forge constitutional identities. 
Reading Bagehot brings back to life not only the events of his 
time, but also the context in which those events were then un-
derstood and given meaning. As we comprehend better the con-
stitution of yesteryear, so in turn are we able to see more clearly 
just where it is that we have now got to. 
Taking constitutional history seriously-and by constitu-
tional history I mean not only the history of constitutional law, 
but also the historical development of the political ideas on 
which constitutional law is based-is perhaps nowhere more im-
portant for constitutional lawyers than in Britain. The history of 
British constitutional law is, as is well known, peculiar. Its pecu-
liarity lies in the fact that no one historical moment trumps any 
other in offering authoritative constitutional meaning. Most of 
the world's constitutional orders now contain formal written 
documents that enjoy a privileged position above all other 
sources in determining what the constitution is. The United 
States Constitution is, of course, a paradigmatic example. Writ-
ten constitutional texts such as that of the United States are visi-
ble (and legally enforceable) manifestations of the fact that in 
the political history of the nation, one historical moment-or se-
ries of historical moments8 - was more important than all others 
in the formation of that nation's political and constitutional iden-
tity. Such nations have not experienced smooth, even constitu-
tional development: rather, their history has been marked by 
8. In the context of the United States it could be argued that it is not only the 
founding which is of unusual constitutional consequence, but also reconstruction: see, 
e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (Yale U. Press, 
1998). 
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revolution, civil war, and perhaps invasion or other military de-
feat. Written constitutions are never drawn up in moments of 
political tranquility or prolonged stability-think not only of the 
United States, but more recently of post-war Germany, of post-
apartheid South Africa, or of post-communist Russia. For na-
tions such as these, it is clear, indeed banal, that some periods of 
history are more critical to state-building and to the forging of 
new constitutional identities than others. One might expect 
therefore, constitutional scholars to focus on some periods more 
than on others. 
Britain's constitutional order, however, owes its authority 
not to any one moment, or even series of moments, but to the 
much more amorphous accumulation of time. This is not because 
the British political experience has been smooth: after all there 
was military defeat at the hands of both the Romans (55BC) and 
the Normans (1066), there was civil war in the 1640s, and there 
was revolution in the 1680s. Rather, the unusual nature of the 
unwritten or uncodified British constitution is due to the timing 
of these events: they all occurred too early. Written constitutions 
are neither natural nor inevitable. They are convenient inven-
tions of the political Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. 
Had Britain experienced invasion, civil war, or revolution during 
or since the eighteenth century, it is highly likely that its consti-
tution would now look much more like the American, the 
French, or the German constitutions. In the period since the in-
vention of the modern written constitution, Britain's political 
experience has been rough, but never so rough as to merit a 
fresh start. Never since 1689 has there been a moment so potent 
as to be able unambiguously to tower over all subsequent mo-
ments. England's union with Scotland (in 1707) to form Britain; 
Britain's union with Ireland (in 1800) to form the United King-
dom; and the United Kingdom's belated accession to the Euro-
pean Economic Community (in 1973) each might have consti-
tuted such moments had political hands been played differently. 
But while all of these events have led to constitutional changes, 
none of them led to such wholesale reform as would require a 
new constitutional code. 
Instead of enjoying particular moments of constitutional 
formation, Britain's ancient constitutional order has simply 
emerged out of over eight centuries of almost entirely unbroken 
government. Each new development is woven into the rich fabric 
of the constitution, usually apparently seamlessly, but on occa-
sion with rough edges on which later problems can find them-
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selves snagged. Sometimes the fabric tears and is repaired, but in 
over eight hundred years it has been discarded only once, and 
even then only temporarily.9 Thus, contemporary constitutional 
law includes authoritative and binding sources from Magna 
Carta (1215) to the Representation of the People Act (1983) via 
the Bill of Rights (1689) and the Act of Settlement (1701 ). 
This creates something of a problem for the British constitu-
tional law scholar who is serious about seeking to understand the 
historical development of her subject. How can one learn and 
remember eight centuries of history? It is simply too much- the 
fabric is so rich it suffocates. Thus, while nowhere is it more 
pressing to be aware of the historical dimension of the subject, 
nowhere is it more impossible. To cope, we make things up. We 
make believe that, for all the historical continuity we know to be 
such a feature of the British constitution, some periods can be 
seen as more pressing than others. For the past one hundred 
years and more, a common perception among British constitu-
tional scholars has been that it was the period during which and 
about which Bagehot wrote that is one of the most pressing of 
all. In this respect constitutional scholarship echoes a theme 
found throughout twentieth century British studies: namely, the 
privileging of the years 1865-1895 as if the last third of the nine-
teenth century constituted the foundinfc the modern British 
state, of its manners, mores, and methods. 0 
Even if this is an unjustified perception-even if on a proper 
analysis the mid-nineteenth century turned out not to have been 
so central to the British constitutional story-it would remain an 
important perception. Even if people are wrong to believe what 
they believe, their very believing it gives it weight. It does not 
make it right, of course, but it does make it important. And the 
fact that throughout the twentieth century it was orthodox to be-
lieve that the mid-nineteenth century was a formative moment 
makes it imperative that we understand what Bagehot's period 
represented-even if what it represented was more mythical 
than real. 11 
9. I am referring to the interregnum, or commonwealth: that is, to the Cromwel-
lian period that separated the execution of King Charles I in 1649 from the coronation of 
King Charles II in 1660. The latter event is known as the "Restoration," and for good 
reason. 
10. For an authoritative excavation and interrogation of this theme, see E. Hobs-
bawm and T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge U. Press, 1983). 
II. For an account of the British constitutional order that locates the mid-
seventeenth century, rather than the mid-nineteenth century, at its center, see Adam 
Tomkins, Public Law chs. 1-2 (Oxford U. Press, 2003). 
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II. DICEY, BAGEHOT, LAW, AND CONVENTION 
Dicey and Bagehot complement each other. They do not 
repeat one another, but neither do they contradict each other. 
Dicey was a lawyer- he was Vinerian Professor of English Law 
at All Souls College in Oxford. Bagehot on the other hand was a 
political journalist-he spent much of his career at the Econo-
mist. Dicey taught us two lessons. The first was that the constitu-
tional order was made up of two components, which he labeled 
the legal and the conventional; and the second was that the law 
of the constitution contained within it two ground-rules, which 
he labeled the "sovereignty of Parliament" and the "rule of 
law".12 It is worth taking a little care to outline what Dicey 
meant by these terms before we turn to the substance of Bage-
hot's account. 
The first stage of Dicey's argument was to identify that in 
the British constitutional order there were two sources of consti-
tutional authority: constitutional law and constitutional conven-
tion. To this day, this remains the first lesson we teach our con-
stitutional law students, and we owe it to Dicey. The importance 
of the lesson, for Dicey's generation as well as for ours, is that it 
instructs us that if we aim to understand the constitution, we are 
going to have to look beyond the court-room. If we confine our 
attention to the constitution in the courts, there will be much 
that we will miss. For sure the courts play their role, but their 
role is but one among many roles that we will need to investi-
gate. With Dicey we may argue that there are two ways in Brit-
ain in which something may be unconstitutional: it may be un-
constitutional because it is illegal, because it violates some rule 
of constitutional law; or it may be unconstitutional because it is 
unconventional, because it breaches some norm of constitutional 
propriety. Constitutional laws are distinguished from constitu-
tional conventions by virtue of the fact that the former are en-
forceable in courts whereas the latter are not. This is not to say 
that constitutional conventions are unenforceable, but that their 
enforcers are constitutional actors other than judges. 13 
12. See Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution at xii-xv 
(cited in note 4). 
13. Most constitutional conventions are enforced by Parliament. It is, for example, a 
constitutional convention that all Ministers are accountable to Parliament (this is the consti-
tutional rule that explains Prime Minister's Question Time, among other things). If a Minis-
ter fails to account to Parliament for the actions, decisions, and policies of his department, 
he will be required by Parliament to resign from office. This is a rule that cannot be judi-
cially enforced, but is nonetheless constitutionally enforced-enforced by Parliament. 
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It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance to the 
British constitution of conventions. Conventions are not add-
ons, appended as an afterthought to the legal bulk of the consti-
tution. If anything, the reverse would be more accurate: the law 
has come relatively late to British constitutionalism. The core of 
the British constitution is not legal, but political-or, in Diceyan 
terms, conventional. The existence of the Prime Minister, for ex-
ample, is a creature of convention, not of law. There is no law 
that provides for the office of Prime Minister. Thus, it would not 
be unlawful for there to be no Prime Minister, although it would 
be both unconventional and unconstitutional. Neither is there 
any law that answers the question of who should be the Prime 
Minister. The office is in the gift of the Queen, although consti-
tutional convention now requires that the Queen must offer the 
position to the person who is the leader of the political party that 
after a general election commands an overall majority of seats in 
the House of Commons. Thus, it would not be unlawful for the 
Queen to appoint me as her Prime Minister, although it would 
be both unconventional and unconstitutional (unless of course I 
happened to be the leader of the political party with an overall 
majority of seats in the Commons). 
What is perhaps unusual about this situation is not that the 
law of the constitution does not provide for the Prime Minister, 
but that despite this legal silence, British constitutionalists would 
nonetheless argue that it would be unconstitutional for there to 
be no Prime Minister. Compare for example the way in which 
the United States Constitution regulates the executive branch. 
While the President is catered for by Article II of the Constitu-
tion, there is no mention of either his Cabinet or of his thou-
sands of civil servants, aides and advisors. In the United States, it 
would not be contrary to constitutional law for the President to 
fail to appoint a Cabinet. It would be unusual, but it would not 
be unconstitutional in the same sense as the Queen's failure to 
appoint a Prime Minister would be unconstitutional. The United 
States Constitution shares with the British a number of gaps, 
omissions, or silences-thus it is not the omission of the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet from the law of the constitution that is 
particularly odd. What is remarkable is the way in which the 
British have plugged the gaps of their constitutional law with 
binding non-legal rules of constitutional behavior-that is to say, 
with constitutional conventions. Conventions are prescriptive, 
not descriptive. They are binding rules that lay down what ought 
to happen: they are not merely descriptive of what does happen. 
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The existence of the Prime Minister is but one example of 
constitutional convention. There are many others. A good num-
ber of them relate to the powers of the Queen. It is a popular 
misconception of the British constitution that the Queen is a 
mere figurehead, a ceremonial head of state with little real 
power. Such a portrayal may be popular, but it is seriously mis-
guided. The undemocratic truth is that the Queen remains a per-
son of extraordinary legal power. In law, she may appoint 
whomsoever she wishes to be her Prime Minister. She may dis-
miss the Prime Minister from office at any time, for any reason, 
or for none. There is no remedy in judicial review to act as a 
check on the exercise of these powers. Parliament still meets at 
the behest of the Queen. There is an Act of Parliament (that is 
to say a statute) which provides that the Queen must call a Par-
liament at least every third year/4 but the calling and dissolution 
of Parliament remains a matter of royal prerogative, and again 
these are prerogative powers the exercise of which are beyond 
the reach of modern judicial review law. In law the Queen may 
refuse her assent to any Bill passed by the Houses of Parliament, 
giving her a unique veto over all legislation. Once again, no 
court would entertain an application for judicial review of the 
exercise of this power. These examples serve to demonstrate the 
extraordinary legal powers of the Queen. 
But to outline only the law of the constitution is to see less 
than half the picture. For in all of these areas conventions oper-
ate so as significantly to limit the availability of these legal pow-
ers. We have already seen that convention provides that the 
Queen will appoint as her Prime Minister only the person who is 
the leader of the political party with an overall majority of seats 
in the House of Commons. Convention further provides that the 
Queen will dissolve Parliament only on the advice of her Prime 
Minister, and that she will not exercise her power to veto legisla-
tion. At least, convention would appear so to provide. No-one 
can be sure, however. The uncertainty arises directly out of the 
nature of conventions. Conventions are habits, or traditions. If 
something is repeatedly done, and there is a good constitutional 
reason for its being done, it can over time be said to be a consti-
tutional convention. There is no authoritative list of conventions, 
and neither is there a sure-fire test that can be adopted to iden-
tify whether a habit is a mere political custom or a binding con-
stitutional convention. 
14. Meeting of Parliament Act 1694. 
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The conventions mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
however, are all uncontroversial. All British constitutional com-
mentators would accept that they are constitutional conventions. 
But even in these uncontroversial instances, difficulty lurks. 
Conventions are based on habits, or traditions. This makes them 
a useful tool to analyze the propriety of normal behavior, and 
also of behavior that is clearly abnormal. If for example the 
Queen were to appoint me as Prime Minister, or were to dissolve 
Parliament tomorrow without Tony Blair having requested her 
to do so, we would have no difficulty in describing the Queen's 
behavior as unconventional (and therefore as unconstitutional). 
But what if the situation is neither clearly normal nor clearly ab-
normal? In these circumstances, conventions can relatively easily 
break down and lose their normative force. Consider for exam-
ple the rule that the Queen must appoint as her Prime Minister 
the person who is the leader of the political party with an overall 
majority of seats in the House of Commons. What if there is no 
such person, or no such party? The former situation might occur 
if a party leader dies or resigns and there is no obvious successor: 
whom should the Queen appoint as her Prime Minister then? 
The latter situation might occur if after a general election a hung 
Parliament is returned: that is to say, a House of Commons in 
which no one party enjoys an overall majority. 
These are not unrealistic hypotheticals. Both of these situa-
tions have occurred during the present Queen's reign: the former 
in 1957 and again in 1963, and the latter in 1974.15 The point here 
is that in these out of the ordinary situations conventions are 
useless. Being based as they are on things which routinely hap-
pen, when the routine is interrupted, there is no rule to instruct 
the constitutional actor how to behave. In instances concerning 
the appointment of the Prime Minister, once convention disap-
pears all the Queen has is the law, and all the law provides is that 
as Queen she may appoint whomsoever she wishes to be her 
Prime Minister. This is why her power remains vast: conventions 
will act as effective constraints on the exercise of the Queen's 
constitutional powers only when normal constitutional circum-
stances prevail, and not when the unusual occurs-as, in politics, 
it inevitably will, from time to time. 16 
15. For a full discussion of these events, see Tomkins, Public Law ch. 3 (cited in 
note 11). 
16. Another constitutional convention insists that the Queen acts only, and always, 
on Prime Ministerial advice. What if a Prime Minister advised the Queen to refuse her 
assent to a Bill that had been passed by both Houses of Parliament: would she be acting 
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In the century that has passed since Dicey published The 
Law of the Constitution lawyers have expended a great deal 
more energy on the second stage of Dicey's argument than they 
have on the first. It will be recalled that Dicey's second argument 
was that, having distinguished the legal from the conventional, 
he then proceeded to identify what he considered to be the two 
cardinal rules of the law of the constitution. The "sovereignty of 
Parliament" was the rule that governed the relationship between 
the courts and the legislature, and the "rule of law" was the rule 
that governed the relationship between the courts and the execu-
tive. Dicey argued that the sovereignty of Parliament meant that 
Parliament could make or unmake any law whatsoever, and that 
nobody (the courts included) could override or set aside an Act 
of Parliament. The practical operation of the sovereignty of Par-
liament has now been significantly altered by Britain's member-
ship of the European Union, and also by the incorporation in 
1998 of a domestic Bill of Rights, and there has been an inordi-
nate amount of scholarly ink spilt on attempting to reconcile 
these developments with Dicey's legal arguments. The rule of 
law has been likewise affected by the late-twentieth century de-
velopment of British administrative law and its central compo-
nent, judicial review. 17 
Re-reading Bagehot now, it is something of a puzzle that 
lawyers have focused so much on the second part of Dicey's ar-
gument, and so little on the first. For it is the law/convention dis-
tinction, rather than the detailed contents and operation of the 
principles of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law, that 
speaks so forcefully to the peculiar identity of British constitu-
tional practice. And it is very much on this aspect of constitu-
tionalism, and not on the law, on which Bagehot focused in The 
English Constitution. Indeed, there is no mention either of the 
sovereignty of Parliament or of the rule of law in Bagehot's text. 
Having made his all-important law/convention distinction, Dicey 
left the conventions of the constitution relatively untouched, and 
concentrated only on the law. Bagehot, by contrast, barely men-
tions the law at all. There is no consideration in his work of the 
constitutional roles to be played by courts or by judges acting ex-
tra-curially. Rather, Bagehot's enterprise was to seek an under-
standing of how an essentially monarchic and aristocratic consti-
tution could be made to work in an age where both monarchy 
unconstitutionally to accept the advice, or unconstitutionally not to accept the advice? 
17. For an account of these developments, see A. Bradley and K. Ewing, Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law chs. 4, 6 & 8 (Longman, 13th ed, 2003). 
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and aristocracy were losing their allure. At the opening of the 
twenty-first century, it is clear that of the two Bagehot should be 
the more important writer not only to political scientists and to 
journalists, but also to lawyers. The reasons why this is so are set 
out in the following two sections. 
III. BAGEHOT'S ARGUMENT 
Bagehot's purpose was to set out and to celebrate the vari-
ous institutions of English 18 government as they were at the time 
he wrote: that is to say, in 1865-1867. His readership was English, 
and his celebration was designed to persuade his domestic audi-
ence of the superiority of what they had over the claims of alter-
native forms of government. His principal point of comparative 
reference was the United States (this contrasts with Dicey's 
principal point of comparative reference, which was France). 
Bagehot's argument was less that the English system of govern-
ment was universally superior over the American, and more to 
the effect that it simply suited the English better. For a book that 
hails from a grand imperial time, there is surprisingly little colo-
nial ambition to the work. 
Bagehot's account commences with the Cabinet, and then 
proceeds to discuss the Monarchy, the two Houses of Parlia-
ment, and the constitution's "supposed" (p. 149) checks and bal-
ances, before concluding with a brief consideration of some as-
pects of constitutional history. Each of Bagehot's chapters 
contains profound insight, as revealing of the constitution as it 
stood in 1865 as it is provocative in evaluating its subsequent de-
velopment 140 years on. His most famous idea is contained in 
the opening chapter, on the Cabinet. In this chapter Bagehot in-
troduces a framework of analysis which he employs throughout 
the book, namely his distinction between the "dignified" and the 
"efficient" (p. 5). In Bagehot's view, all constitutions that, like 
the English, grow over many centuries contain dignified parts 
and efficient parts. The former are "those parts which excite and 
preserve the reverence of the population" whereas the latter are 
"those by which [the constitution] in fact works and rules" (p. 5). 
For Bagehot this distinction was more than a mere rhetorical de-
vice, handsome for the writer, but operating at some remove 
18. Like many Englishmen, Bagehot used the terms "English" and "British" inter-
changeably. Nothing infuriates the Scots and the Welsh more, and it has now become the 
(somewhat tedious) fashion to append the expression "{sic)" to the title of Bagehot's 
book whenever it is cited. 
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from actual practice. Rather, it went to the very core of the sub-
ject, not only on paper, but equally in fact. 
Bagehot saw, of course, as all good constitutional commen-
tators must, that constitutions are about power. For Bagehot, 
however, constitutions (or at least successful constitutions) must 
both gain power, and must then use it. The dignified is that 
which performs the former task, by winning "the loyalty and 
confidence of mankind", and the efficient is that which performs 
the latter, by employing this "homage in the work of govern-
ment" (p. 5). Thus, "the dignified parts of government are those 
which bring it force-which attract its motive power. The effi-
cient parts only employ that power" (p. 5). Applying this distinc-
tion to the English constitution, Bagehot saw the Monarchy as 
constituting the dignified element, and the House of Commons 
as constituting the efficient. In his own words: 
" ... the characteristic merit of the English constitution is that 
its dignified parts are ... very old and venerable; while its ef-
ficient part ... is decidedly simple and rather modern. We 
have made, or, rather, stumbled on, a constitution which ... 
has two capital merits: it contains a simple efficient part 
which, on occasion, and when wanted, can work more simply 
and easily, and better than any instrument of government that 
has yet been tried; and it contains likewise historical, complex, 
august, theatrical parts, which it has inherited from a long 
past, which take the multitude, which guide by an insensible 
but an omnipotent influence the associations of its subjects." 
(p. 8).19 
There is considerable analytic force in Bagehot's schema 
here. We saw in the previous section of this review that in the 
contemporary English constitutional order there is frequently 
some distance between that which the law provides and that 
which is constitutional. Thus, to repeat an example discussed 
above, the law provides that the Queen may appoint whomso-
ever she wishes to be her Prime Minister, but it would be con-
trary to constitutional convention for the Queen not to appoint 
as her Prime Minister the leader of the political party that has an 
overall majority of seats in the House of Commons. It is just this 
distance between the formal and the actual that Bagehot is seek-
ing to capture in his distinction between the dignified and the ef-
ficient. This distinction overlaps with Dicey's division of law 
from convention. It is the law that feeds the dignity of the consti-
19. Emphasis in the original. 
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tution, but convention which allows for efficient government un-
der the cloak of the law. 
This is perhaps clearest in the context of the powers of the 
Crown. Even today the law vests ultimate executive authority in 
the Crown. In reality however it is the Queen's Ministers, not 
the Queen herself, who exercise the bulk of that power, even if 
the law continues to imagine that such Ministers are merely the 
vehicles of royal will. There are some powers that only the 
Queen may exercise (appointing the Prime Minister, dissolving 
Parliament, granting royal assent to legislation, etc), but even 
most of these are exercised only on Prime Ministerial advice. All 
remaining prerogative powers-that is, all powers emanating 
from the Crown rather than from statute-are exercised by Min-
isters. These include: signing treaties, declaring war, defending 
the realm, employing civil servants, and issuing passports, as well 
as many others. All of these activities would in former times 
have been exercised by the Monarch him- or herself. Over the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the 
practical exercise of these powers was gradually handed over to 
senior Ministers. This process of royal withdrawal from front-
line policy-making was already well underway mid-way through 
the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901) when Bagehot was writ-
ing. Yet while the personnel of government transformed from 
royal courtiers to career politicians, and while the locus of power 
moved from the royal palaces of Whitehall and Windsor to the 
Parliament at Westminster, the formal constitution altered not 
one jot. The law and the dignity of the constitution continued to 
imagine that British government remained the Crown's govern-
ment long after such a picture had become utter pretence. It was 
exactly this covert transformation that Bagehot sought to cap-
ture and to celebrate in The English Constitution. 
There was one concept, and one institution, that Bagehot 
saw as being central to this covert transformation. The institu-
tion was the Cabinet. But underpinning the Cabinet was the idea 
that Bagehot considered to be the real key. This he famously de-
scribed as the "efficient secret of the English Constitution" (p. 
8). Bagehot's "efficient secret" consisted of an outright repudia-
tion of one of the notions of constitutional government that is 
most sacred to Americans: namely, the separation of powers. 
Bagehot knew that the constitutional orthodoxy in Enlighten-
ment thinking, brought into focus in the constitutions of both the 
United States and of France, was that legislative and executive 
power should be kept apart. Just as the functions of legislating 
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and of executing the laws should be kept separate, so too should 
the personnel responsible for legislating and for executing the 
laws be separate groups of people. 
Bagehot suggested that what enabled efficient government 
under England's dignified constitution was "the close union, the 
nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers" 
(pp. 8-9). He identified the Cabinet as the institution in which 
this central idea was given form. Bagehot wrote that the Cabinet 
was "a committee of the legislative body selected to be the ex-
ecutive body" (p. 9). This is a rather curious definition. The 
Cabinet is composed of the most senior Ministers in the govern-
ment. It is chaired by the Prime Minister, who decides who sits in 
his Cabinet, and who has which job within it. There may be 
many political constraints on whom the Prime Minister may se-
lect to sit in his Cabinet. The Prime Minister may himself be un-
popular within his own party, or he may be relatively inexperi-
enced, and he may feel that he needs a certain very popular, or 
experienced, colleague to play a prominent role in the govern-
ment even though the two figures disagree over policy or clash 
personally. Alternatively, the Prime Minister may enjoy only a 
small majority in the House of Commons and may feel that his 
government will be more secure if his Cabinet represents as 
broad a coalition of interests as possible, incorporating hawks 
and doves, or hard-liners and moderates, and so forth. 
Aside from these ordinary political constraints that some 
(especially the weaker) Prime Ministers may feel, there is but 
one constitutional constraint on whom he may call on to serve in 
his Cabinet. This is the rule-it is a convention, not a rule of 
law- that all members of the Cabinet must be either members of 
the House of Commons or of the House of Lords. Indeed, this 
rule applies not only to Cabinet Ministers, but also to junior 
Ministers who are in government but not in the Cabinet. Every 
Minister in every administration must be a member of one of the 
two Houses of Parliament. This is what Bagehot was referring to 
when he talked of the "nearly complete fusion" of executive and 
legislative. In terms of personnel there is no separation between 
the two. This remains as true now as it was in Bagehot's time. 
We shall return to this issue in the final section of this review, 
below, when we will address the question of why it is that all 
Ministers must simultaneously be members of Parliament. There 
is a sound constitutional reason for the rule, as we shall see. 
After discussing the Cabinet, Bagehot then proceeds to con-
sider both the dignified parts (the Monarchy) and the efficient 
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parts (Parliament) in more detail. His discussions of both remain 
acute and valuable. On the Monarchy Bagehot offers first a de-
fense of Monarchic forms of government, and then moves on to 
analyze the roles that the Monarch plays in English government. 
His defense of Monarchy is unexceptional, not especially persua-
sive, and is now somewhat outmoded. His essential argument is 
that Monarchy should be preferred over other forms of govern-
ment because it provides the strongest government. He offers 
three reasons for this view: first that it is "intelligible" govern-
ment-the "mass of mankind understand it, and they hardly 
anywhere in the world understand any other" (p. 34). The sec-
ond is that "English monarchy strengthens our government with 
the strength of religion" (p. 37). Since the reign of Henry VIII 
(1509-1547) the Monarch has been head of the Church of Eng-
land as well as Head of State. Thirdly, "the Queen is head of our 
society" (p. 41) meaning that it is she, rather than the Prime 
Minister and his wife, who receives foreign dignitaries and who 
gives the most prestigious parties, the Queen being able to un-
dertake these responsibilities with considerably more style than 
a professional politician, or so Bagehot evidently thought. 
None of these arguments has stood the test of time. As to 
the first Monarchy is now less well understood than presidential 
government- there is considerable popular confusion in today's 
Britain about exactly what the legal role of the Monarch and her 
family is. As to the second, religion and government have grown 
steadily more distant from one another (at least in the West) 
over the course of the twentieth century, even in Britain. As to 
the last, this has simply been overtaken by events, with the 
Prime Minister rather than the Monarch now taking as much of 
a lead in foreign affairs as he does in domestic politics. Even if it 
remains true that for the small British Establishment, royal 
events are still the apogee of the social calendar, such events re-
volve around horse-racing and garden parties, and have no con-
stitutional relevance. The consequence of this is stark: Bagehot 
offers nothing that can be adopted by today's Monarchists in de-
fense of Monarchy as a form of contemporary government. Even 
if his arguments were meaningful in the 1860s-and even this 
point is at best arguable-they withstand no scrutiny now. This is 
not a criticism of Bagehot: it was not his purpose to articulate a 
defense of Monarchy that would continue to apply more than a 
century after his death.20 But it is interesting to observe that 
20. Bagehot died in 1877, aged 51. 
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whatever the defense of Monarchy would be today, its terms 
would have to be substantially different from those of its defense 
of the mid-nineteenth century. For an institution that above all 
privileges continuity over change-surely the very essence of he-
redity is continuity-this is an intriguing observation. 
Having defended Monarchy, Bagehot then discusses the 
roles of the Monarch in English government. Here, in two re-
spects, his analysis is more valuable today than is his defense. If 
the best known line from his chapter on the Cabinet is the one 
about the fusion of powers being the "efficient secret" of the 
constitution, the best known line from his chapter on Monarchy 
is that the Monarch has three rights: "the right to be consulted, 
the right to encourage, and the right to warn" (p. 60). This little 
mantra is frequently incanted by today's students of constitu-
tional law and British politics. It has become a token line of text 
in the unwritten constitution. This is surprising, since it tells us 
relatively little. Who is it that the Monarch has the right to be 
consulted by, to encourage, and to warn? What is it that the 
Monarch has the right to be consulted, and to warn, about? 
Once the consultation is received and the encouragement and 
warnings given, what consequences follow? The answer to the 
first of these questions must be that it is the Prime Minister. 
When both the Queen and the Prime Minister are in London, 
they meet each week for a short conference in Buckingham Pal-
ace. The meetings are shrouded in absolute secrecy: what is dis-
cussed is strictly confidential between the two. No advisers are 
present (or so we are led to believe). This is presumably where 
consultation, encouragement, and warnings are given and taken. 
Is this, in Bagehot's terms, a dignified diversion from, or an effi-
cient means of, the business of government? Only a handful of 
people know, and none of them will say. Neither the content nor 
the consequences of the Queen's regular audiences with her 
Prime Ministers are permitted to leak into the public realm. 
A less well-known, but much more important, line from 
Bagehot's chapter on the Monarchy is his comment that "a re-
public has insinuated itself beneath the folds of a monarchy" (p. 
44).21 This is the greatest single insight contained in the entire 
work, and the final section of this review is dedicated to explor-
ing its many meanings. 
21. The sentiment is repeated in Bagehot's final chapter, on constitutional history, 
in which he writes that "the appendages of a monarchy have been converted into the es· 
sence of a republic" (p. 179). 
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Before we come to that, however, we should pause to add a 
word on Bagehot's analysis of Parliament. Bagehot starts with 
the House of Lords. The Lords he places mainly on the digni-
fied, rather than on the efficient, side of the constitution. In this, 
he was half a century before his time. Bagehot argued that the 
locus of parliamentary power was the House of Commons, and 
that the Lords had but two powers: a power to delay legislation, 
and a power to revise it (p. 78). This was very much how the 
House of Commons liked to view the House of Lords, but the 
House of Lords itself was not prepared to come to this view until 
well into the twentieth century, preferring until then to present 
itself as if it were at least equal, if not superior, to the Commons. 
The incompatibility of these views came to its inevitable head in 
1909, when the House of Lords vetoed the budget proposals of 
the Liberal government after they had sailed through the House 
of Commons. The impasse that ensued was the nearest the Brit-
ish have come to a full scale constitutional crisis since 1689. It 
contributed to the premature death of one King (Edward VII), 
embroiled his inexperienced successor (George V) in deep po-
litical controversy, necessitated two general elections in quick 
succession, and culminated in the most significant constitutional 
reform of the twentieth century, the Parliament Act 1911. This 
Act formally reduced the powers of the House of Lords to those 
that Bagehot had ascribed to it fifty years earlier (delay and revi-
sion-scrapping the Lords' veto) and in effect ratifying the legis-
lative superiority of the Commons.22 
Whereas prescience was the hallmark of Bagehot's analysis 
of the House of Lords, his discussion of the House of Commons 
was characterized principally by his rare understanding of the 
multiplicity of roles that the Commons plays. Bagehot appreci-
ated that the Commons was a complex institution that defied 
easy pigeon-holing. The subtlety and deftness of touch with 
which Bagehot portrayed the House of Commons stands in stark 
contrast to the rather simplistic accounts of Parliament that can 
be found in so much of the constitutional literature of the twen-
tieth century. For most of the past one hundred years Parliament 
in general and the House of Commons in particular have been 
portrayed as being mainly a legislature, as being the institution 
in which national law-making takes place. There is the occa-
sional reference to the notion that Parliament is in addition a 
22. For a wonderfully entertaining account of this story, see G. Dangerfield, The 
Strange Death of Liberal England (Stanford U. Press, 1935). 
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scrutineer, and that the government of the day is accountable to 
Parliament (and principally to the House of Commons), but on 
the whole the focus of the treatment that Parliament is given in 
the standard literature is on Parliament and the House of Com-
mons as a legislature.23 
Bagehot argued that the House of Commons had five sepa-
rate functions. Its first and "main" (p. 94) function was to be the 
"electoral chamber ... the assembly which chooses our presi-
dent" (p. 94). Whereas in the United States the electoral college 
is a temporary being that has no continuing powers or responsi-
bilities once the President is elected, the House of Commons 
acts as a permanent electoral college, to which the government 
of the day is permanently accountable, and which may at any 
time dismiss the government from office. To consider this to be 
the most important power of the House of Commons may seem 
odd in an era in which we have become accustomed to seeing the 
Commons mainly as a legislature, but Bagehot is surely right in 
his analysis. To say this is neither to underestimate nor to un-
dermine the significance of law-making, but it is to recognize 
that law is less made by Parliament, and more made through Par-
liament. It is, on the whole, the government's law that is made. 
Parliament is merely the vehicle through which it is made. The 
right of legislative initiative vests in the government of the day, 
and while it remains possible for backbench, non-government 
MPs to promote legislative initiatives, the reality is that the vast 
bulk of the legislation that Parliament passes is made at the in-
stigation of the government, and not of individual backbenchers. 
This is even more uniformly the case now than it was in Bage-
hot's time. And in this sense, again, there is a remarkable pre-
science about Bagehot's understanding of Parliament. 
In addition to this main function of the House of Commons, 
Bagehot listed four further functions for the Commons. The first 
of these was its "expressive function" (p. 95), that is to say, its 
task of expressing the mind of the English people. Secondly, 
there was its "teaching function" (p. 96)-its task of teaching the 
nation what it does not know. Thirdly there was its "informing 
function" (p. 96). In former times, Bagehot observed, "one office 
of the House of Commons was to inform the sovereign what was 
wrong. It laid before the Crown the grievances and complaints of 
23. See for example E. Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford U. 
Press, 1998), and I. Loveland, Constitutional Law: A Critical Introduction (Butterworths, 
2nd ed, 2000); c[ C. Turpin, British Government and the Constitution: Text, Cases, and 
Materials (Butterworths, 5th ed, 2002). 
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particular interests. Since the publication of the parliamentary 
debates a corresponding office of Parliament is to lay these same 
grievances, these same complaints, before the nation, which is 
the present sovereign. The nation needs it quite as much as the 
king ever needed it" (p. 96). The last function was that of "legis-
lation" (p. 97). Bagehot noted that "some persons will perhaps 
think that I ought to enumerate a [further] function of the House 
of Commons-a financial function" (p. 97). But Bagehot re-
jected this as a separate function, and instead considered it to be 
an aspect of the legislative function. In this he was perhaps, for 
once, mistaken. The House of Commons does possess powers of 
peculiar importance in terms of scrutiny of the government's 
revenue and expenditure, recognized in Bagehot's era by Glad-
stone, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer established in 1866 
the office of Comptroller and Auditor General, an Officer of the 
House of Commons, whose task it was-and indeed to this day 
remains-to assist the Commons in its tasks of financial scru-
tiny.Z4 
There is of course a good deal more that could be written 
about Bagehot's argument in The English Constitution, but what 
has been noted here should be sufficient to give a flavor of his 
core concerns, at least as far as they relate to the central institu-
tions of English government: Monarchy and Parliament. What 
remains is to consider how Bagehot conceptualized the relation-
ship between Monarchy and Parliament, using his framework 
distinction between the dignified and the efficient. This is the 
topic that is discussed in the final section of this review. 
IV. THE REPUBLICAN MONARCHY 
Bagehot knew that the constitution vested supreme author-
ity in the Crown: the Queen was both head of state and head of 
the church; justice was done in her name; and it was she who ap-
pointed Prime Ministers and dissolved Parliaments. Yet he also 
knew that the locus of political power was the House of Com-
mons, not Windsor Castle: no government could survive in office 
without the support of the House of Commons, and the second 
that such support was withdrawn was the second that the gov-
ernment would fall. In Bagehot's era such power of the House of 
Commons was not merely latent, but active: as Smith reminds us 
24. The Comptroller and Auditor General is now the head of the National Audit 
Office, which was established, and is governed, by the National Audit Act 1983. 
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in his introduction, between 1852 and 1866 the House of Com-
mons brought down no fewer than six administrations (p. xviii). 
It was one of Bagehot's main purposes to seek to explain this 
apparent paradox. How could both the Crown and the House of 
Commons simultaneously be top constitutional dog? As we have 
seen, his neat explanatory device was to divide the constitution 
into two-the dignified and the efficient-and to explain that 
while the Crown ruled over the former, the House of Commons 
governed the latter. In order to understand the British constitu-
tion, you need to know both its dignified and its efficient ele-
ments. Without the dignified you would not be able to see, for 
example, where either the government of the day, or the courts, 
obtain the bulk of their constitutional authority from. But with-
out seeing also the efficient you would think that neither the 
government of the day nor the courts were subject to a great de-
gree of constitutional accountability. 
The British constitution is in this sense characterized by 
something of a duopoly, not just between the concepts of the 
dignified and the efficient, but also and more importantly be-
tween the institutions that generate and give authority to the 
dignified and the efficient: that is to say, between the Crown and 
the House of Commons. To understand why this is so we have to 
return to the point about constitutional history that we started 
with. 
Britain's constitutional history is long and virtually unbro-
ken. Practically the whole of its history over the past eight centu-
ries (since Magna Carta) has been taken up with the same ques-
tion: namely, how to subject the Crown's government to 
constitutional account? For a few years in the seventeenth cen-
tury the question seemed to have changed (to "how can the 
Crown's government be replaced?") but the experiment with re-
publican forms was short-lived, brutal, unpopular, and seemingly 
unsuccessful. With the single exception of the mid-seventeenth 
century hiatus, the principal constitutional concern has been not 
how to remove the Crown or what to replace it with, but on the 
contrary how to keep it, yet at the same time how to limit it, how 
to control it, and how to locate it within a modern constitutional 
setting. Just as there has been remarkable continuity in the prin-
cipal constitutional question ("how to subject the Crown's gov-
ernment to account?"), so too has there been remarkable conti-
nuity in the understanding of who it is that should perform this 
constitutional task-of who it is that should answer the constitu-
tional question. 
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It has never been assumed that the courts could perform 
this role. With the judicial oath of allegiance being sworn to the 
Queen, the courts being housed in the Royal Courts of Justice 
(the name is no mere coincidence), and the very constitutional 
authority of the courts being derived directly from the Crown, 
the courts have never been well-placed to impose limits on the 
exercise of the Crown's power. While it is true that in very re-
cent times (since the mid-1960s) the courts have made some ef-
fort at reform in this regard/5 the law reports remain littered 
with precedents ancient and modern that show extraordinary ju-
dicial deference to the Crown.26 It was no doubt for reasons such 
as these that Bagehot ignored the courts in The English Constitu-
tion. 
Instead of placing its faith in the courts, the British constitu-
tion has always seen Parliament as the institution with lead re-
sponsibility in the task of holding the Crown to account. Indeed, 
Parliament as an institution emerged out of the perceived need 
to hold medieval kings to account. It was the Barons who forced 
King John to agree to the terms of Magna Carta. Over the 
course of the century that followed it was the same Barons (and 
their heirs) that began to meet more regularly and that in time 
formed what became the House of Lords. The House of Com-
mons followed later in the fourteenth century. Thus Parliament 
developed in early modern England not out of the need to legis-
late, but out of the need to subject the Crown's government to 
some form of account.27 The people and its Parliament would 
continue to accept royal government, but only on Parliament's 
terms. The Crown would be allowed to govern, but Parliament 
would set out the limits within which the Crown was to rule. 
This ancient constitutional balance between the Crown on 
the one hand and Parliament on the other continued to provide 
stable government in England from the era of Magna Carta, 
through the Wars of the Roses and the rise of the Tudors, and 
began to break down only with the passing of the Tudors after 
the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603. It was this year that 
marked the end of the Tudor period and the beginning of the 
25. See, e.g., M. v. Home Office [1994]1 A.C. 377; R. v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995]2 A.C. 513. 
26. The classic ancient authority is R. v. Hampden (the Ship-money case) (1637) 3 
St. Tr. 825. Among more recent authorities are Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minis-
ter for the Civil Service [1985] A. C. 374 and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1989] Q.B. 26. 
27. Hence Bagehot's portrayal of the "main" function of the House of Commons 
being to act as a permanent electoral college. 
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Stuart. The Stuart kings found that they could not work with 
Parliament, and after a quarter-century of struggle (1603-1629) 
sought eventually to rule without it. The experiment of the so-
called "personal rule" (1629-1640) failed, however, and within 
two years of Parliament's recall in 1640, England had collapsed 
into the anarchy of civil war. It was Oliver Cromwell's parlia-
mentary forces that emerged victorious, and from 1649-1660 it 
was Parliament's turn to rule without the Crown. This experi-
ment proved almost as disastrous as the Crown's earlier attempts 
to rule without Parliament had been, and in 1660, two years after 
Cromwell's death, King Charles II was restored to the throne. 
Again, however, as with Magna Carta four centuries earlier, the 
Crown was required to govern on terms laid down by Parlia-
ment. These terms are now formally provided for by the Bill of 
Rights 1689 and the Act of Settlement 1701. 
The point here is this. As even a cursory glance at England's 
constitutional history will reveal, England has a royal govern-
ment for one reason and for one reason alone: namely, that Par-
liament has decreed it. Government continues to be carried out 
in the Crown's name (this is true even today), but it is Parlia-
ment that sets out the limits to the Crown's power (and not the 
courts), and it is to Parliament that those exercising the powers 
of the Crown (that is to say, Ministers) are constitutionally ac-
countable for their actions.28 Until the beginning of the nine-
teenth century this curious expression, "the Crown," still largely 
meant the King himself, in the company of advisers and courti-
ers. But over the course of the early nineteenth century, those 
advisers-known as Ministers-began to play an ever more 
prominent role, particularly those advisers who were also Mem-
bers of Parliament. By the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign 
(1837) government had switched from being largely in the hands 
of the Monarch him- or herself, to being largely in the hands of 
the Ministers of the day. The legal powers of government, it is 
important to note, were unaffected by this change.Z9 What did 
28. It is to facilitate such accountability that Ministers must be Members of Parlia-
ment. Thus, this apparent violation of the classic separation of powers doctrine, far from 
encouraging tyranny (as Madison thought) is the British constitution's principal means of 
seeking to combat tyranny. For a fuller account, see Tomkins, Public Law ch. 2 (cited in 
note 11). 
29. Thus, just as two hundred years ago it would have been the King himself who 
exercised his prerogative to make treaties, to declare war, and to defend the realm, so 
today it is the Prime Minister and his senior Cabinet colleagues who exercise those same 
royal prerogative powers to make treaties, to declare war, and to defend the realm. The 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet are, of course, accountable to Parliament for the way in 
which they exercise, or fail to exercise, these powers. 
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change, however, was the nature of the government's account-
ability to Parliament. While it was the Monarch him- or herself 
that governed, Parliament could hold the government to account 
only in the most formal way. But once effective government 
shifted from the Monarch him- or herself to parliamentary Min-
isters appointed by the Monarch, the degree of parliamentary 
oversight, scrutiny, and accountability could be radically en-
hanced. 
Such parliamentary accountability reached its zenith during 
the middle of Queen Victoria's reign, and it was exactly this 
spirit that Bagehot sought to capture in The English Constitu-
tion. At no time of internal peace has Parliament held more 
power over the Crown's government than in the mid-nineteenth 
century. Before about 1820 royal government was still too far 
removed from Parliament for fully effective scrutiny. After 
about 1870 Parliament became ever more dominated by political 
party, as mass democracy eventually began to arrive, such that 
parliamentarians' loyalty was offered and withdrawn strictly 
along party lines rather than in accordance with whether the 
government was acting with constitutional propriety or not.30 
But between these dates, when Bagehot was writing, was the 
heyday of parliamentary power.31 Hence his wonderful line that 
a parliamentary republic had "insinuated itself beneath the 
folds" of the old monarchy. 
Today it appears once more that the Crown's government 
has regained the upper hand, that the parliamentary republic is 
in retreat, and that the constitutional garb is as majestically 
monarchic as it ever was. The question of how to stop a Parlia-
ment dominated by political party from voting always on party 
lines, and thereby from undermining the ideal of government ac-
countability to an independent Parliament, is the most pressing 
one that is faced by the British constitutional order. Most of to-
day's constitutional commentators have given up entirely, and 
seem to believe that Parliament can no longer be expected to 
bear such great responsibility, and that any accountability we 
have now is going to have be found through the courts rather 
30. For a detailed examination of the differences between Parliament governed by 
party, and Parliament governed by constitutional propriety, see A. Tomkins, The Consti-
tution after Scott: Government Unwrapped (Oxford U. Press, 1998). 
31. It is for this reason that Bagehot's period has throughout the twentieth century 
been perceived as having been so important in the development of British constitutional-
ism. It is because parliamentary power has so declined in the 140 years since Bagehot 
that we should be cautious about constructing general principles about parliamentary 
government from the particular events of his time. 
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than in Parliament. Even some senior judges now appear to be 
thinking broadly along these lines.32 But anyone placing their 
faith in the courts will first have to tackle the problem that judi-
cial power as it is presently constructed is neither sufficiently in-
dependent of the authority of the Crown, nor sufficiently robust 
in the face of the government's sometimes rather spurious argu-
ments to the effect that it needs unfettered emergencrl Crown 
powers in order to safeguard Britain's national security. 
Bagehot would have decried such an attempt to hand over 
to the judges the constitutional functions that he thought were 
Parliament's. But Bagehot, like everybody else has done since, 
would himself have struggled to accommodate his beautiful and 
brilliant vision of a genuinely parliamentary government to the 
contemporary reality of a mass democracy. Democracy has its 
price. It is curious, but the injection of democracy into the re-
publican monarchy that Bagehot knew and loved has revitalized 
the monarchic in the constitution at the expense of the republi-
can, and not the other way around. We have moved from are-
publican monarchy to the people's monarchy. How to re-invest 
in the modern and democratic constitution the values of parlia-
mentary accountability that Bagehot the constitutional monar-
chist so cherished is the most vital constitutional question of our 
times. Re-reading Bagehot will not provide us with the answer, 
but it will remind us of the urgency of the question. 
32. See, for example, R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire 
Brigades Union [1995]2 A.C. 513. 
33. See, for example, Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 
[1985] A.C. 374 and Home Office v. Rehman [2001] 3 W.L.R. 877. See further on this, 
Tomkins, Public Law cbs. 3 & 6 (cited in note 11). 
